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BACK TO PRIMA PAINT CORP. V. FLOOD & CONKLIN
MANUFACTURING CO.: TO CHALLENGE AN
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT YOU MUST CHALLENGE
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Andre V. Egle
Abstract: The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires courts to order parties in a dispute
arising out of a commercial contract containing an arbitration provision to proceed to
arbitration unless the formation or performance of the arbitration agreement itself is at issue.
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co. that under the FAA, courts, instead of arbitrators, should resolve claims
for fraudulent inducement of arbitration agreements. However, courts were not permitted to
resolve claims for fraud in the inducement of the underlying commercial contracts. The Court
also held that when deciding whether to enforce an arbitration agreement, a court should only
consider the issues related to making and performing that agreement. The federal circuit
courts have applied Prima Paint in two ways. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
held that a court may consider a claim that a commercial contract containing an arbitration
agreement is void, even if the party has not alleged that the arbitration agreement is invalid. In
contrast, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that alleging that a contract is void is not
enough to put the contract's arbitration agreement at issue under the FAA and Prima Paint.
This comment argues that to put an arbitration agreement at issue a party should specifically
plead that it is invalid. A mere allegation that the underlying commercial contract is void is
insufficient because federal law encourages arbitration and treats arbitration agreements as
severable from the contracts in which they are included. Only if a court finds that an
arbitration clause is merely a part of the underlying commercial contract should the court
resolve a claim that the contract is void.

In 1925, Congress passed the United States Arbitration Law codified
as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).' The FAA was Congress' response
to the reluctance of federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements.2 The
FAA requires courts to order arbitration of a dispute arising out of a
contract containing an arbitration provision unless the formation or
performance of the arbitration agreement is not in issue Since then,
arbitration of controversies arising out of maritime and commercial
transactions has become an increasingly popular means of dispute
resolution. However, it is common for the parties to arbitration
agreements to challenge the validity of the agreements in a judicial
forum. The challenges are especially common when a commercial or
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
2. See Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV.
265, 265 (1926) (noting that the FAA "reversed the hoary doctrine that agreements for arbitration are
revocable at will and are unenforceable").
3. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967).
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maritime contract contains broad boilerplate language mandating
arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the]
contract."4 In many cases, the party that wants to avoid arbitration asserts
that the arbitration agreement is invalid merely because the underlying
contract is deficient. Lower federal courts have reached different
conclusions as to whether a federal court or an arbitrator should resolve
these challenges in light of the relevant provisions of the FAA5 and the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.6
The FAA is a powerful statute that governs enforceability of the
majority of commercial arbitration agreements throughout the nation and
preempts any additional requirements for arbitration agreements imposed
by states.7 The FAA mandates that federal courts enforce an arbitration
provision "in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" 8 if the provision satisfies three
conditions. First, it must be in writing.' Second, the arbitration provision
must relate to a maritime transaction or a transaction involving interstate
commerce.'i Third, the arbitration agreement must be valid and able to
withstand any legal or equitable grounds for the revocation of any
contract. "
Many courts have addressed the FAA's requirement that, before a
federal court may enforce an agreement to arbitrate, the agreement must
be as valid as any other contract.' More specifically, courts have reached
different conclusions regarding whether a court or an arbitrator should
resolve challenges to the validity of an arbitration clause that is a part of
a larger commercial contract. A partial answer to this question was
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967 in Prima Paint.3 There, the
4. See, e.g., Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 53 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980).
5. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2000).
6. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
7. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1984) (explaining that the FAA has created
a substantive federal law that preempts conflicting state law provisions as to enforceability of
arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce and maritime transactions).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2 defines "commerce" for FAA purposes as "commerce among the several States or
with foreign nations." Section 1 further specifically excludes from "commercial contracts" under the
FAA "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. § 1.
9. See 9 U.S.C. § 1.
10. See id.
11. See id.§2.
12. Id.
13. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
Court held that when determining the validity of an arbitration agreement
a federal court can only consider issues related to the formation and
performance of the arbitration agreement itself. 4 The Court also stated
that if a party challenges the arbitration clause itself as fraudulently
induced, courts may proceed to resolve the challenge. 5 However, the
Court did not settle the question of whether a claim that the entire
contract, and thus an arbitration clause contained therein, is void and
unenforceable should be resolved in court or in arbitration.
Prima Paint has prompted conflicting decisions in the federal Circuit
Courts regarding the validity of arbitration agreements under the FAA. 6
The main point of controversy among the Circuit Courts relates to a
situation where a party challenges the arbitration agreement by alleging
that the underlying commercial contract is void, instead of voidable. A
contract is voidable if it is generally valid, but one or more parties to the
contract has the power to avoid the contractual relationship on grounds
such as fraud in inducement of the contract, duress, or mistake.' 7 In
contrast, a contract is void if one of its essential elements, such as mutual
assent, is missing." A void contract is not a contract at all; it is a
"promise" or "agreement" that is void of legal effect." Circuit Courts for
the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Prima Paint's
holding-that courts should only resolve allegations of the invalidity of
an arbitration agreement itself-does not apply when the validity of the
entire contract is challenged.2" Therefore, these courts hold that judgesnot arbitrators-should consider the contract's validity. In contrast, the
appellate courts for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have taken the position
that even if a party to the contract claims that the contract is void, the
party must specifically allege that the arbitration provision is invalid
before the court may consider the challenges to the contract.2 '

14. Id. at 404.
15. Id.
16. See Burden v. Check Into Cash ofKy., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2001) (summarizing

approaches of Courts of Appeals to interpretation of Prima Paint).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. b (1981).

18. See id. cmt. a.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2000); Three Valleys
Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991); Chastain v. RobinsonHumphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11 th Cir. 1992).
21. See. e.g., Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (5th Cir.
1987); C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sees. Corp., 912 F.2d
1563, 1567-68 (6th Cir. 1990).
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This Comment argues that under Prima Paint, federal courts should
determine the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a commercial
or maritime contract only if a party to the contract specifically alleges
that the provision should be revoked as invalid at law or in equity. A
specific challenge to an arbitration clause is required even in situations
where a party to the contract alleges that the entire contract is void. As an
alternative, a party may challenge an arbitration clause by asserting the
invalidity of the entire contract only if the arbitration clause is not
severable from the contract. Part I explains that the FAA promotes
enforcement of arbitration agreements and that, in most cases, the FAA
and the courts treat arbitration agreements as severable from the rest of
the contract. Part II discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Prima
Paint.Part III discusses Circuit Courts' interpretation of PrimaPaint and
describes the two major approaches used in the different Circuits. Part IV
argues that the FAA and Prima Paint require parties who ask federal
courts to resolve disputes arising under contracts containing an
arbitration provision to specifically allege and prove that the provision is
invalid.
I.

THE FAA PROMOTES ENFORCING ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND DIRECTS FEDERAL COURTS TO
ENFORCE THEM AS SEVERABLE FROM THE UNDERLYING
CONTRACTS

Congress adopted the FAA to create an enforcement mechanism for
otherwise valid arbitration agreements in commercial and maritime
transactions.22 The FAA was intended to further arbitration as a means of
alternative dispute resolution that would eliminate the delays associated
with judicial proceedings, avoid the expense of litigation, and promote
decisions regarded as just in the business world.23 Federal courts had in
the past treated arbitration agreements as not binding and revocable at
will.24 However, Congress strongly encouraged courts to enforce
arbitration agreements by explicitly stating in the FAA that written
arbitration provisions in maritime transactions and transactions involving
interstate commerce should be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."25

22.
23.
24.
25.

Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2, at 275-78.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 265.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
The U.S. Supreme Court has also favored enforcing arbitration
agreements in commercial contracts. In Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,26 the Court determined that
Congress declared a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements in the
FAA and created "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
27
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.
Further, the Court stated that any doubts regarding the scope of arbitrable
issues, such as construction of the contractual language or the defenses to
arbitration, should be resolved in favor of arbitration.28
The FAA is a powerful substantive and procedural statute that
preempts all inconsistent state laws and promotes uniformity in
enforcement of arbitration agreements.29 The Act applies to any
arbitration agreements relating to interstate commerce or maritime
transactions.30 Significantly, the FAA treats arbitration agreements as
severable from the contracts that contain them.31
A.

The FAA PromotesArbitration

Prior to the FAA's enactment, American courts acknowledged
arbitration as an option but adhered to the traditional view that arbitration
agreements are revocable at will and should not be enforced by courts.32
As a result, a party that wanted to avoid an arbitration agreement only
33
had to refuse to proceed and the court would not enforce the agreement.
Suing for damages arising out of the breach of the arbitration agreement
generally could not adequately redress the aggrieved party's inability to
arbitrate. 34 Thus, no meaningful remedy existed for the intentional breach
of arbitration agreements. Congress passed the FAA to remedy courts'
reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements. 5

26. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
27. Id. at 24 (interpreting section 2 of the FAA codified as 9 U.S.C. § 2).
28. Id. at 24-25.
29. See infra Part I.B.
30. See infra Part I.B.
31. See infra Part I.C.
32. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2, at 270.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) ("The legislative history of
the Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate.").
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Section 2 of the FAA, passed in 1925, states that "[a] written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ...shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable., 36 According to the statute, arbitration
agreements may be enforced in two ways. First, under section 3 of the
FAA, a party wishing to enforce an arbitration agreement related to
ongoing litigation can apply for a stay of the litigation.3 7 In this situation,
the court where the law suit is pending, "upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration.. . shall... stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.""8 Second,
under section 4 of the FAA, a party purporting to arbitrate a dispute
before the other party files a law suit may petition the court for an order
directing the parties to proceed with arbitration under the agreement.3 9
Here, the court "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration.., is not in issue.., shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
' 40
agreement.
Congress adopted the FAA to encourage the arbitration of contract
disputes and to provide an enforcement mechanism for private arbitration
agreements. 4 ' However, the foremost purpose of the FAA was to
encourage courts to enforce arbitration agreements by ordering specific
performance in situations where a party refuses to comply with the
agreement's terms. 42 No such remedy existed in federal courts prior to
enactment of the FAA.43 In addition, Julius Henry Cohen, the American
Bar Association's draftsman of the FAA, suggested that the purpose
36. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See id. § 4.
40. Id.
41. See generally Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2; see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) ("The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce
private [arbitration] agreements into which parties had entered and that concern requires that [federal
courts] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation, at least
absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute.").
42. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2, at 271-72.
43. See id. at 276 (explaining that prior to enactment of the FAA federal courts recognized the
existence and validity of arbitration agreements, but refused to enforce them by way of specific
performance); see also Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-20 (pointing out that Congress adopted the FAA "to
overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate").

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
behind the Act was in line with the threefold purpose of arbitration as a
means of alternative dispute resolution." First, arbitration would
effectively eliminate the long delays usually incident to court
proceedings.45 Second, arbitration would help parties to avoid the
expense of litigation.' Third, arbitration, rather than regular judicial
proceedings, would provide a better means of reaching a decision
regarded as just in the business world.47 The third purpose is particularly
important because courts mainly apply general rules that may not fit a
particular commercial dispute.48 Further, in an ordinary jury trial, a
dispute may not receive an adequate analysis because of the jurors' lack
of expertise in commercial matters, whereas an experienced commercial
arbitrator can skillfully scrutinize a complex dispute.
Consistent with arbitration's purpose to prevent long delays in court
proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that
the FAA's ultimate goal is to "move the parties to an arbitrable dispute
out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible. ' 50 For
example, in Moses H. Cone, the Court explained that the liberal federal
policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements stems directly
from section 2 of the FAA. 5' The Court declared that under the FAA, any
doubts as to the scope of issues subject to arbitration should be resolved
in favor of arbitration.52 The lower federal courts have followed the
Court's pro-arbitration policy.53
B.

The FAA Preempts InconsistentState Law

The FAA has both substantive and procedural components. It is
substantive because it sets uniform requirements for the enforceability of
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2, at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

49. See id.

50. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983); see
also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (stating that when
courts interpret arbitration agreements "due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring
arbitration") (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468,476 (1989)).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
52. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
53. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 453 (2d Cir. 1995); Wilson Elec.
Contractors, Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1989).
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any arbitration agreements relating to certain types of transactions.5 4 For
example, section 2 of the FAA states that a written arbitration provision
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 55 However,
the FAA is also a procedural statute because it spells out the procedures
that federal courts must follow when enforcing valid arbitration
agreements. Under the FAA, courts must "make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration" upon satisfaction that "the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue." 6 This procedural scheme ensures that valid arbitration
agreements are properly enforced.
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to have created
federal substantive arbitration law57 that preempts all state laws that set
additional requirements and limitations on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. 8 The Court has held that the FAA governs the
enforceability of arbitration agreements in both federal and state courts
"notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary."59 Therefore, the FAA applies to any arbitration agreements
relating to interstate commerce or maritime transactions, regardless of
whether a party seeks to enforce the arbitration agreement in a federal or
state court.6 0
54. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
55. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
56. Id. § 4.
57. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984)
(stating that "the FAA rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the
Commerce clause [of § 8 of Article I of the Constitution]," which implies that the substantive rules
of the Act should bind both state and federal courts). See also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that Congress used its Article I, § 8, clause 3
power to enact § 2 of the FAA which is a "declaration of national [substantive arbitration] law
equally applicable in state or federal courts"). But see Keating, 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the FAA is a merely procedural statute that Congress adopted through
exercise of its power to control jurisdiction of lower federal courts under Article III of the
Constitution, which grants to Congress no power to control proceedings in state courts); Cohen &
Dayton, supra note 2, at 266 (noting that the FAA was intended to reverse "the hoary doctrine that
agreements for arbitration are revocable at will and are unenforceable").
58. See Keating, 465 U.S. at 10-15.
59. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
60. See id. at 14-15. The Court has emphasized, however, that the FAA does not create
independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 25 n.32. The necessity of an
independent ground for federal subject matter jurisdiction in suits to enforce arbitration agreements
under the FAA is implicit in language of section 4 of the FAA providing that "any United States
district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil
action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
C.

Arbitration Clauses are Severable Under the FAA

According to section 2 of the FAA, arbitration clauses are severable
from the contracts that contain them.6" Section 2 states that a written
arbitration provision in a contract "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable. 62 Thus, the FAA provides that an arbitration clause may be
separately enforced unless there are any legal or equitable grounds for its
revocation.63 This conclusion stems from the statute's specific focus on
arbitration provisions as separate contractual units. Indeed, section 2 of
the FAA specifically mentions the enforceability of an arbitration
provision "in any maritime transaction or contract" as independent from
the enforceability of the contract itself.64 Thus, at least one circuit has
65
held that the statute "does not purport to affect the contract as a whole.
In addition, federal and state courts have always treated arbitration
agreements as independent contracts. 66 For example, in Hamilton v.
Home Insurance Co.,67 the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly stated that "it
is ... well settled that the agreement [to arbitrate] ... is collateral and
independent; and that a breach of this agreement, while it will support a
separate action, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action on the principal
contract." 8 Further, courts' treatment of arbitration agreements as
severable contractual units has not been affected by the passage of the
FAA. In the years following the adoption of the Act, courts have held
that the illegality of part of the contract does not operate to nullify an
agreement to arbitrate. 69 Finally, the Court in Prima Paint affirmed the
position that, under the FAA, arbitration agreements are severable from
the contracts in which they are embedded.70
parties." Keating, 465 U.S. at 15 n.9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). Thus, before a federal court may issue
an order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the FAA, there must be diversity of citizenship or some
other independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26.
61. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1959).
62. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
63. See id.
64. See id. (emphasis added); Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 409-10 (emphasis added).
65. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 409-10.
66. Id. at 410.
67. 137 U.S. 370 (1890).
68. Id. at 385.
69. See generally Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987);
Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds,346 U.S. 427 (1953); Watkins
v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945).
70. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967); Snowden v.
Checkpoint Cashing; Elite Fin. Serv., Inc., 290 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting Prima Paint's
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In sum, the FAA treats arbitration agreements as severable from
commercial contracts that contain them and promotes their enforcement
as long as the agreements satisfy the basic elements of any valid
contract.7 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as creating a
federal policy favoring arbitration.72 Both substantive and procedural
aspects of the FAA further the statute's main goal-to make specific
performance of arbitration agreements available to aggrieved parties. 3
I. IN PRIMA PAINT, THE COURT HELD THAT UNDER THE
FAA, A COURT MAY CONSIDER CLAIMS FOR FRAUD IN
THE INDUCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE, BUT
NOT FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT OF THE ENTIRE
CONTRACT
In Prima Paint the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted section 4 of the
FAA and held that when a person alleges that a contract containing an
arbitration clause is invalid on grounds of fraudulent inducement, a
federal court can only resolve challenges of fraudulent inducement
concerning the arbitration clause itself.74 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that when ruling upon an application for stay of the action
pending arbitration, "a federal court may consider only issues relating to
the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate."75 According
to the Court, challenges of fraud in inducement of the underlying
contract should be reserved for an arbitrator. 76 Given the specific factual
setting of the case,77 the Court did not decide how to allocate the
respective authorities of a court and an arbitrator in cases where a party
asserts that the contract containing an arbitration clause is void from its

holding that federal courts should consider only issues relating to the making and performance of
arbitration agreements "has come to be known as the severability doctrine");
Stevens/Leinweber/Sullens, Inc. v. Holm Dev. & Mgmt, Inc., 795 P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Ariz. App.
1990) (stating that under the concept of separability endorsed by Prima Paint, "an arbitration
provision is considered to be an independent and separate agreement between the parties to the
underlying contract").
71. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
72. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
73. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
74. Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 403-04.
75. Id. at 404.
76. Id.
77. The plaintiff in Prima Paint alleged that the contract containing the arbitration provision was
a result of fraudulent inducement, i.e., that it was voidable. See id. at 398.

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
very inception78 and argues that the arbitration clause is automatically
invalid as well.
Prima Paintwas the first and only Supreme Court case to interpret the
FAA in the context of the allocation of the respective powers of a federal
court and an arbitrator. The ultimate issue in Prima Paint was whether a
federal court or an arbitrator should resolve a claim of fraud in the
inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause.79 The Court
held that a federal court deciding whether to stay an action and order
arbitration under section 3 of the FAA "may consider only issues relating
' More
to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate."
specifically, the Court determined that if a party to the contract asserts a
claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, a federal
court can adjudicate such a claim.8 However, the FAA does not
authorize a federal court to resolve claims of fraud in the inducement of
the contract as a whole. 2
Prima Paint involved a consulting agreement between two
corporations.8 3 This agreement followed the formation of a contract
under which the plaintiff purchased the defendant's paint business.8 ' The
consulting agreement contained a broad arbitration clause providing that
"any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or
breach thereof, shall be settled in arbitration in the City of New York." 5
After the defendant had filed a bankruptcy petition, the plaintiff refused
to perform the consulting agreement and filed suit in a federal court
seeking rescission of the agreement on the ground that the agreement
was fraudulently induced by the defendant's misrepresentation of its
solvency. 6 The district court granted the defendant's motion to stay the
action pending arbitration,87 holding that an allegation of fraud in the
inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause was a question

78. See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe Supreme
Court in Prima Paint] did not grapple with what is to be done when a party contends not that the
underlying contract is merely voidable, but rather that no contract ever existed.").
79. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 396-97.
80. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 403-04.
82. Id. at 404.
83. Id. at 397.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 398.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 399.
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for the arbitrator and not for the court.8" The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed.89
The Court emphasized that section 4 of the FAA allows federal courts
to resolve only claims of fraud in inducement of an arbitration clause
itself, not claims of fraud in the inducement of the underlying contract.9"
According to the Court, Congress's explicitly mandated such scheme. 9'
This section 4 axiom prompted the Court to acknowledge the Second
Circuit's position in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,Inc.92
that as a matter of federal law arbitration clauses are separable from
contracts where they are included.93 Consequently, the PrimaPaintCourt
agreed with the lower court's holding that the arbitration agreement was
severable from the commercial contract for the purpose of evaluating
claims of fraudulent inducement of the underlying contracts.94
Because of the case's factual setting, the Prima Paint Court focused
solely on situations where a party challenges the entire contract as
fraudulently induced,95 i.e., where the party asserts that the contract is
voidable. A contract is voidable even if it is generally valid, but one or
more parties to the contract have the power to avoid the contractual
relationship on grounds such as fraud in inducement of the contract,
duress, or mistake.96 The Court did not consider how the authority of a
court and an arbitrator would be allocated in a case where a party asserts
that a contract containing the arbitration clause was fraudulently
executed,97 i.e., that the contract is void from its very inception. A
88. Id. (noting that the arbitration clause in the agreement gave the arbitrator very broad
authorities).
89. Id.
at 407.
90. Id. at 403-04.
91. Id. at 403.
92. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
93. See id. at 409-10.
94. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court in Prima Paintendorsed the Second Circuit's position that an arbitration clause is a
separable part of the contract); see also Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 488
(6th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[tihe Court in Prima Paint found that arbitration clauses were
'separable' from the contracts in which they were included").
95. Fraud in inducement occurs when there is a genuine mutual assent to the contract but one of
the parties misrepresents certain facts, such as the quality of goods. See E. ALAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 4.10, at 243-44 (3d ed. 1999).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. b (1981).
97. As opposed to fraud in inducement of a contract, fraud in execution, also know as fraud in
factum, occurs when the misrepresentation goes "to the very character of the proposed contract

itself, as when one party induces the other to sign a document by falsely stating that it has no legal
effect." See FARNSWORTH, supra note 95, at 243. If the other party neither knows nor has reason to

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
contract is void if one of its essential elements, such as mutual assent, is
missing; a void contract is not a contract but merely a "promise" or
"agreement" that is void of legal effect.98 Nevertheless, in Prima Paint,
the Court made it clear that a federal court should order arbitration once
it is satisfied that "the making of the agreementfor arbitration... is not
in issue."99
In Prima Paint, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the FAA's
mandate that a federal court should decide the validity of an arbitration
agreement only if a party specifically puts the arbitration agreement at
issue." Under the Court's ruling in Prima Paint, an arbitrator should
rule upon a party's claim for fraud in inducement of the underlying
commercial contract, but a court should rule upon a claim of fraud in
inducement of the arbitration clause.' The Court did not decide whether
a court or an arbitrator should resolve a party's claim of fraud in the
execution of the contract. Significantly, the Court treated the arbitration
agreement and the commercial contract as separate and independent of
one another.' 02
III. FEDERAL COURTS ARE DIVIDED AS TO HOW THE PRIMA
PAINT RULE APPLIES WHERE A PARTY DOES NOT
SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGE AN ARBITRATION
PROVISION BUT ASSERTS FRAUD IN EXECUTION OF THE
CONTRACT
The lower federal courts have applied Prima Paint in different ways.
The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have limited Prima Paint's
application to claims of fraud in the inducement of a contract containing
an arbitration clause, i.e., claims where a party to a valid commercial
contract seeks to avoid or rescind the contract by arguing that it is
voidable.'0 3 These courts have held that if a party alleges that a contract
know the character of the proposed agreement, the misrepresentation nullifies any effect of the
contract or makes the contract void ab initio. Id.
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a (1981).
99. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 404.
101. Id. at 403-04.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that Prima Paint is limited "to challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a
contract," and that Prima Paint does not apply to allegations that the contract containing an
arbitration clause lacked assent ) (emphasis in original); see also Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky.,

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:199, 2003

with an arbitration clause was never legally formed because it lacked
mutual assent, a court, not an arbitrator, should decide whether the
contract is valid. 4 Thus, by alleging that the entire contract is void, a
party may successfully avoid arbitration. In contrast, the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits have held that a party purporting to avoid arbitration of disputes
arising out of a commercial contract must specifically challenge the
validity of the arbitration clause." 5 Thus, a party in the Fifth or Sixth
Circuits cannot avoid arbitration by merely alleging that the entire
contract is void.
A.

The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits Have Limited Prima Paint
to Claims ofFraudulentInducement

The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Prima Paint
does not apply to contracts that are fraudulently executed, such as in
situations where a party asserts that the arbitration clause is invalid
because the underlying contract is void from its very inception. The
courts reason that a party alleging that it never assented to the contract
with an arbitration provision challenges "the very existence of any
' 0 6 The
agreement, including the existence of an agreement to arbitrate."'
Ninth Circuit's decision in Three Valleys Municipal Water District v.
E.F. Hutton & Co.'07 took the lead in developing this theory. The Ninth
Circuit held that Prima Paint applies to arbitration provisions in voidable
contracts, but does not apply to arbitration agreements in contracts void
from their very inception.' Since Three Valleys, the Third and Eleventh
Circuits have followed the Ninth Circuit's approach." 9
In Three Valleys, the Ninth Circuit held that the Prima Paint rule is
limited to claims of avoidance or rescission of a contract.1 0 Three
LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2001) (summarizing the cases where courts found that Prima Paint
does not apply to allegations of non-existent contracts).
104. See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l. Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2000).
105. See Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987);
Burden, 267 F.3d at 488; C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Sees. Corp., 912 F.2d 1563, 1567-68 (6th Cir. 1990); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co.,
833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987).
106. Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (lth Cir. 1992) (emphasis in
original).
107. 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991).
108. See id. at 1140.
109. See, e.g., Chastain, 957 F.2d at 855; Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 106-07.
110. Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140.

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
Valleys involved arbitration clauses in securities accounts agreements."1
The plaintiffs alleged that the district court could not compel arbitration
because the defendant's representative who signed the agreements had
no authority to do so." 2 Thus, the plaintiffs challenged the agreements as
void from their inception based on a lack of the plaintiffs' assent. The
Ninth Circuit agreed." 3
Focusing on Prima Paint's factual setting," 4 the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the ruling in PrimaPaint authorized arbitrators to consider
only claims forfraudulent inducement of a contract, as opposed to claims
for fraud in the execution of a contract."' Thus, the Ninth Circuit limited
the scope of Prima Paint's rule to challenges "seeking to avoid or
rescind the contract."".6 The court reasoned that if a party challenges the
very existence of a contract in which the arbitration clause is
embedded," 7 a district court should resolve such a claim because the
challenging party may have never agreed to the authority of an
arbitrator. 8
Similarly, in Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co.,"' the Eleventh
Circuit held that Prima Paint does not apply when a party contends that
the contract containing an arbitration provision is void. 20 In Chastain,
the plaintiff claimed that she never assented to either the arbitration
agreement or the underlying contract.' 2 ' The plaintiffs father opened a
securities trading account with the defendant,'2 2 executing two customer
agreements in connection with the account. 23 One of the agreements
bore the plaintiffs name, but the plaintiff did not personally sign the
25
agreement.'24 The second agreement bore the defendant's name only.
The plaintiff alleged that she had never authorized her father to open the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1139-41.
See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.at 1137.
See id.
at 1140.
957 F.2d 851 (1
lth Cir. 1992).
Id. at 855.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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account in her name.'2 6 Thus, the plaintiff alleged that both the
arbitration agreement and the underlying contract were void from their
very inception because the plaintiffs signature was forged. Chastain
presented a factual situation upon which the U.S. Supreme Court in
Prima Paint had not ruled: where a party to the commercial contract
containing an arbitration clause asserts that the contract was void from its
very inception.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded in Chastain that if a party disputes
signing the contract that requires arbitration, then that party may not have
agreed to proceed with arbitration at all.' 27 In the court's view, alleging a
lack of assent precluded resolving the dispute by arbitration.' 28 The court
considered the Prima Paintruling to be distinguishable because it did not
require "arbitrators to adjudicate a party's contention ... that a contract
never existed at all."'2 9 The court reasoned that alleging that a contract
was invalid was enough to cast doubt on the validity of the arbitration
agreement. 130
In line with Three Valleys and Chastain, the Third Circuit held in
Sandvik AB v. Advent International Corp.,'3 that under the Court's
ruling in Prima Paint, an arbitrator's jurisdiction should be limited to
resolution of claims of inducement of the contract containing an
arbitrtation clause.132 In Sandvik, the plaintiff claimed breach of a joint
venture agreement containing an arbitration clause. 3 3 The defendant
responded that the agreement was void because its agent lacked authority
to sign the agreement. 34 At the same time, the defendant moved to
compel arbitration under the FAA.'35 The defendant explained that its
dispute of the existence of the contract does not automatically assume the
dispute of the arbitration clause contained therein.'3 6 The district court
126. Id.
127. Id. at 854.
128. Id. (citing Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998, 1000 (11 th Cir.
1986)).
129. Id. at 855.
130. See id.
131. 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
132. Id. at 106-07.
133. The arbitration clause provided that "[a]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with this
agreement ... shall ... be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
Netherlands Arbitration Institute." Id. at 101.
134. Id. at 100.
135. Id.
136. See id.

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
denied the defendant's motion to compel, reasoning that the challenge to
the existence of the underlying contract was sufficient to put the validity
of the arbitration agreement in dispute.'37 The Third Circuit affirmed.'3
The court noted that Prima Paint did not consider the situation in
which a party asserts that a contract underlying the arbitration agreement
is not merely voidable, but non-existent.'39 Further, the Third Circuit
reasoned that determining whether an arbitration agreement exists under
the FAA may depend on the validity of the underlying contract. 4 ° Thus,
before a district court compels arbitration it must first determine whether
the underlying contract was valid.' 4'
The Third Circuit noted, however, that although the defendant failed
to show that the arbitration agreement was valid and severable from the
underlying contract, an arbitration agreement can exist separately from a
larger contract if such agreement independently meets the conditions of
contract formation.4 Further, the court acknowledged that in most cases
where there is no defect in signatory power of a party, if one party
promises to arbitrate in exchange for the other party's promise to
arbitrate, each promise forms a sufficient consideration for the other.'
Thus, the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits recognize a distinction
under Prima Paint between "void/fraud in execution" challenges and
"voidable/fraud in inducement" challenges to a contract containing an
arbitration agreement. In these Circuits, an allegation that a contract is
void is sufficient to assert that the the arbitration agreement is invalid,
thereby authorizing a court under Prima Paint to rule on the contract's
validity. In contrast, alleging that a contract is merely voidable fails to
put the arbitration agreement "in issue" under Prima Paint and an
arbitrator will resolve the merits of the allegation.

137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
at 105.
140. Id. at 106 (citing Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.
1980)).
141. "[W]e conclude that the doctrine of severability presumes an underlying, existent,
agreement. Such an agreement exists, under the Prima Paint doctrine, even if one of the parties
seeks to rescind it on the basis of fraud in the inducement. [Such agreement]... does not [exist] if
no contract ever existed." Id.
142. Id. at 108. Formation of a valid contract is accomplished when the parties have expressed
mutual assent to the contract's terms supported by adequate consideration. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
143. Id. (citing Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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The Fifth and Sixth CircuitsHave Held that Prima Paint Requires a
Specific Allegation of Invalidity of an ArbitrationAgreement to
Prevent its Enforcement

The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that, although PrimaPaintwas
decided in the context of fraud in the inducement of a contract, it
pronounced a general rule that a party resisting arbitration must
specifically challenge the arbitration provision in a commercial contract
even if the party alleges that the entire contract is void.'" The Circuit
Courts have reasoned that the rule of Prima Paint should apply to
allegations of fraud in the execution of the contract because the fraud in
the inducement alleged in PrimaPaint would pervade the entire contract
containing the arbitration clause just as much as the fraud in the
execution of the contract. 45 The most current representative cases
supporting this approach are the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lawrence v.
Comprehensive Business Services14' and the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Burden v. Check Into Cash of Kentucky, LLC.'47
1.

Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Services: An Arbitration
Agreement May be EnforceableEven if the Underlying Contractis
Illegal

In Lawrence, the Fifth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement may
be enforceable under the FAA even if the underlying contract is illegal.'48
The court opined that in order for a party to obtain a court ruling on the
validity of an arbitration agreement, that party must assert the illegality
of the arbitration clause itself' 9 Importantly, the court emphasized that
the question of the validity of an arbitration agreement, as separate from
the underlying commercial contract, is a matter of the federal law under
section 2 of the FAA.'50

144. See, e.g., C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp.,
912 F.2d 1563, 1567-68 (6th Cir. 1990).
145. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987).
146. Id.
147. 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001).
148. See id. at 1161-62.
149. Id. at 1162.
150. Id. (discussing preemption aspects of the FAA under Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10-13 (1984)).

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
The plaintiffs in Lawrence challenged an agreement containing an
arbitration clause as illegal and therefore void. 5 ' Plaintiff Robert
Lawrence, a Texas certified public accountant, entered into a franchise
agreement with the defendant, allowing him to use the defendant's trade
name. 5 2 The agreement required Lawrence to make periodic royalty
payments to the defendant and contained an arbitration clause.'53 After
signing the contract, the plaintiff learned that the Texas State Board of
Public Accountancy had prohibited other franchisees from operating an
accounting practice under the defendant's name.' 54 The plaintiff advised
the defendant that he could not carry out the contract because if he did,
he would lose his license.' 55 The plaintiff sued the defendant, seeking a
judgment declaring the contract illegal and unenforceable.'56 In response,
the defendant moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contract.' The plaintiff argued
that ordering arbitration under the arbitration clause in an illegal contract
is improper.' The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and held that
under the command of Prima Paint, an arbitrator should decide whether
the franchise agreement between the parties was valid and legal because
the plaintiff did not challenge the arbitration clause itself.'59
The Fifth Circuit declined the plaintiffs invitation to recognize the
difference between the Prima Paint plaintiffs claim of fraud in
inducement of the contract 6 ° and the Lawrence plaintiffs' fraud in
execution16 argument, because fraud in inducement and fraud in
execution have the same pervasive effect on the contract.' 62 Moreover,
the court stated that it read the PrimaPaint decision as mandating courts
to order arbitration even if a party asserts that the contract containing an
arbitration clause fails to comply with certain state regulations and is

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id. at 1161.
Id. at 1160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162.

160. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

162. Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1162.
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therefore void.6 3 Finally, the Fifth Circuit stated that the FAA
established that, "as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."'"
2.

Burden v. Check Into Cash of Kentucky, LLC: Prima Paint
Requires Specifically Challengingthe Validity of the Arbitration
Agreement

In Burden, the Sixth Circuit strongly suggested in dicta that the FAA,
as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Prima Paint, requires a
specific challenge to the validity of the arbitration provision in the
contract.' The plaintiffs in Burden were trustees for four bankruptcy
estates and other numerous residents of Kentucky. 6' 6 The main defendant
was a creditor of the bankruptcy estates. 6 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant violated Kentucky usury laws by loaning money to Kentucky
residents at allegedly usurious interest rates.' The reverse side of each
loan agreement at issue contained an arbitration clause providing that all
claims, demands, or disputes "arising under this Agreement or the
transaction in connection with which this Agreement has been executed"
should be resolved by arbitration.'69 The plaintiffs contended that prior to
December of 1997, the loan agreements had no arbitration clause on the
reverse side of the form.'70 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants never informed them about the arbitration clause, and that the
plaintiffs learned about the clause only when the defendant attached its
copy to their motion to compel arbitration.' 7' The plaintiffs claimed that
the loan agreements containing arbitration clauses were invalid. 7 '
Finally, the plaintiffs relied on the theory that the court, not an arbitrator,

163. Id. (citing Mesa Operating Ltd. P'ship v. La. Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 244 (5th
Cir. 1986)).
164. Id. at 1164 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25
(1983)).
165. Id. at 491.
166. Id. at 486.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 487.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 489.
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must consider their allegations that the loan agreements containing the
arbitration clause were void from their very inception.' 73
The Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court should have compelled
arbitration under the PrimaPaint decision because the plaintiffs failed to
identify any misrepresentation particular to the arbitration agreements
and separate from the loan agreements. 7 4 The court noted that the Prima
Paint rule commands a court, rather than an arbitrator, to adjudicate
claims of fraud in the inducement only if such claims concern the
arbitration clause itself.17 ' The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs'
allegations that the arbitration agreements were part of the defendants'
"fraudulent scheme" were arbitrable under Prima Paint.7 6 In reaching
that result, the court relied on the FAA's policy favoring enforcement of
arbitration agreements. 171
Although the Burden court acknowledged the Ninth and Third
Circuits' void/voidable distinction, the court found that such distinction
was improper under Prima Paint and its own precedent. 78 The court
reasoned that the only question that a court should resolve when
determining an arbitrator's authority is whether the issues in dispute
involve "the making or the performance of the section 3 arbitration
clause itself."'7 In light of the language of section 3 of the FAA, 80 the
court decided to adhere to Prima Paint'smandate that a court can only
adjudicate an arbitration dispute if the claim of fraud relates to the
making of the arbitration agreement.'

173. Id.
174. Id. at 491; see also Showden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing; Elite Fin. Serv., Inc., 290 F.3d
631, 637-38 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Burden court properly denied the plaintiffs' challenge
to enforcement of arbitration clauses in loan agreements because the plaintiffs failed to specifically
allege lack of their assent to the arbitration clauses, and instead challenged the substance of the loan
agreements); Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11 th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Burden
court concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations that the loan agreements were void as illegal
"constituted challenge to substance of loan agreements and should thus be decided by arbitrator
rather than by court").
175. Id. at 488.
176. Id. at 491.
177. "As a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration." Id. at 488 (quoting Wilson Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Minotte
Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1989)).
178. See id. at 489-91 (citing C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Sec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1563, 1566 (6th Cir. 1990)).
179. Id. at 489 (citing C.B.S. Employees, 912 F.2d at 1567-68).
180. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
181. Burden, 267 F.3d at 489 (citing C.B.S. Employees, 912 F.2d at 1566).
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Thus, the Circuit Courts' interpretation of the Prima Paint decision is
split into two different approaches. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits emphasize that because Prima Paint concerned fraud in
inducement of the contract containing an arbitration clause, its holding
should be limited to situations in which a contract is valid, but
voidable. 2 On the other hand, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have adhered
to the Supreme Court's admonition in Prima Paintthat a judicial forum
can only resolve the validity of an arbitration clause if a party
specifically challenges making or performing the clause itself. 3
IV. PARTIES MUST SPECIFICALLY ALLEGE THAT AN
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS INVALID TO BRING THE
DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE CONTRACT WITHIN A
COURT'S JURISDICTION
The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts' rulings that the Prima
Paint decision does not apply when an underlying contract may be
void 8 4 ignore the FAA section 2's clear mandate that federal courts
should enforce arbitration agreements independently from the contracts
containing them. 5 Consequently, a court should not disturb an
arbitrator's authority unless the validity of the arbitration agreement
8 6 Because
itself is at issue.Y
the FAA treats arbitration clauses as
severable from the commercial contracts containing them,8 7 a mere
allegation that the underlying contract is void or unenforceable should
not be sufficient to put the arbitration clause at issue under section 4 of
the FAA' 8 and deprive an arbitrator of jurisdiction over the contractual
dispute.
Alleging that a contract containing an arbitration agreement is void or
invalid should not be enough to put the validity of the arbitration
agreement at issue under section 4 of the FAA. By holding that a claim
of fraud in the inducement of a contract is not a claim directed at the
"making" of the agreement to arbitrate, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
182. See, e.g., Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 855 (11 th Cir. 1992).
183. See C.B.S. Employees, 912 F.3d at 1567-68.
184. See supra Part III.A.
185. See supra Part I.C.
186. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
187. See supra Part I.C.
188. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 (holding that if a party moves for stay
pending arbitration, a federal court "may consider only issues relating to the making and
performance of the agreement to arbitrate").

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
Prima Paint did not distinguish claims of fraud in the inducement from
any other challenges to commercial contracts." 9 Instead, the Court
emphasized that the FAA requires federal courts to consider only issues
related to the making and performance of arbitration agreements. 19° The
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' position that alleging a contract is
void is enough to put an arbitration agreement at issue misinterprets the
rule set forth in Prima Paint.'9' Although these Circuits' classification of
challenges as "void/fraud in execution" and "voidable/fraud in
inducement" may help litigants that have failed to properly plead the
invalidity of an arbitration clause, this distinction should be abandoned
because it contradicts the clear language of the FAA and the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. 92 The distinction should
only be used to aid courts in determining whether a party has made a
direct challenge to an arbitration agreement.
A.

The FAA Requires Partiesto Specifically Allege that an Arbitration
Agreement is Invalid

Congress adopted the FAA to create an enforcement mechanism for
arbitration agreements in commercial and maritime transactions by
directing the courts to order specific performance of the agreements) 93
The FAA was intended to further arbitration as a speedy and efficient
way to resolve commercial disputes. 94 Based on that congressional
intent, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that any doubts as to the
scope of issues subject to arbitration should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. 95
'
Under the FAA, a written arbitration provision in a commercial or
maritime contract is valid and enforceable unless it could be revoked on
legal or equitable grounds as any other contract. 96 The FAA's language
treats arbitration agreements as separate from the contracts in which they
are included. This is evidenced by the FAA's provision that an

189. See Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 403-04.
190. See id. at 404.
191. See supra Part 11.
192. See supra Part I.A.
193. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 2, at 276-78.
194. See id. at 269.
195. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (citations
omitted).
196. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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arbitration provision contained within a commercial contract is
independent from the underlying contract. 19 7 Consistent with this
treatment, section 4 of the FAA provides that courts should order parties
to proceed to arbitration as soon as the court is satisfied that "the making
of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not
in issue."'9 8 Thus, for example, if a party claims that the arbitration
agreement was fraudulently induced, the court may adjudicate that claim
under section 4 of the FAA.' 99
The FAA's focus on the arbitration clause as a separate contractual
unit strongly suggests that a party seeking to challenge the validity of an
arbitration clause should directly challenge the arbitration clause."' It
should not be enough for a party to a commercial contract to refuse to
proceed with arbitration merely because the party asserts that the contract
was void and therefore its every term, including the arbitration provision,
is not binding. To the contrary, a party should specifically assert that an
arbitration provision, as a separate agreement, is invalid on some legal or
equitable ground.20 ' Thus, a mere allegation that a contract is invalid
should not remove the dispute from an arbitrator's jurisdiction unless the
arbitration provision is not severable from the underlying contract.
B.

The Prima Paint Rule Should Apply to Allegations that the Contract
Containingan ArbitrationAgreement is Void

A strong federal policy favoring arbitration supports the separate
treatment of arbitration clauses from the contracts in which they are
included.2 2 In enacting the FAA, Congress created federal substantive
arbitration law encouraging the enforcement of arbitration agreements.2 3
The drafters of the FAA acknowledged that substituting judicial
resolution of commercial disputes with arbitration would effectively
eliminate the long delays incident to court proceedings, help parties to
avoid the expense of litigation, and provide a better means of reaching a
decision regarded as just in the business world.2" In line with these
197. See id.; Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 488 (2001) (citing Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967)).
198. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
199. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04 (1967).
200. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
201. Id.
202. See supra Part I.
203. See supra Part I.B.
204. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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goals, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Prima Paint that an arbitrator
should decide issues related to fraud in inducement of a contract
containing an arbitration clause." 5
Consistent with the FAA's meaning and policy, in Prima Paint the
Court authorized federal courts to adjudicate allegations related only to
invalidity of arbitration clauses.20 6 However, the Court did not authorize
the lower courts to consider claims that contracts containing arbitration
clauses are generally void as illegal or as lacking mutual assent. Such
claims should be normally arbitrated pursuant to the contract2 .7 because
the arbitration clauses are in most cases severable from the commercial
contracts in which they are embedded.2 8 Thus, a party's claim that it did
not assent to the contract does not necessarily mean that it did not assent
to the arbitration clause. Consequently, by alleging that a contract
containing an arbitration clause is void, a party in most cases fails to
question the authority of an arbitrator and thereby fails to effectively put
"the making of an arbitration agreement" at issue within the meaning of
section 4 of the FAA.2"
Courts should not consider allegations that an entire contract is void
simply because the arbitration clauses are often embedded in contracts in
a way that the parties fail to notice them. In cases where a person
believes in good faith that he or she did not assent to an arbitration
clause, the person may simply plead that the clause itself, not the
underlying contract, is void. However, parties attacking arbitration
clauses usually have no firm arguments that the arbitration clause should
be revoked under the requirements of section 2 of the FAA.210 Such
parties attempt to get into court "through the backdoor," by alleging that
the entire contract containing the arbitration clause is invalid. 2 ' Under
the Prima Paint decision such a challenge should not be sufficient to

205. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
206. Id.; see also Snowden v. Checkpoint Cashing; Elite Fin. Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 631, 637 (4th
Cir. 2002) (noting that in Prima Paint, the Court held that section 4 of the FAA, and by implication,
section 3 of the FAA, limits a federal court's jurisdiction to challenges to the arbitration clause
itself").
207. See Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987).
208. See supra Part I.C.
209. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
210. See, e.g., Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1162-65 (declining the plaintiffs' direct challenge of the
arbitration clause in the franchise agreement).
211. See, e.g., id. (The plaintiffs were unable to effectively challenge the arbitration clause itself,
that is why they attempted to challenge the entire contract containing the clause as void).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:199, 2003

require a court to resolve whether an arbitration agreement is valid under
section 4 of the FAA.21 2
C.

FederalCourts Should Not DistinguishBetween Void and Voidable
Challengesto Contracts ContainingArbitrationProvisions

The Sixth Circuit in Burden correctly concluded that the Prima Paint
rule applies in situations where a party contends that a contract
containing an arbitration clause is void because it allegedly violates
certain statutory provisions. 2 3 Likewise, in Lawrence the Fifth Circuit
appropriately held that under Prima Paint, an arbitrator should decide
whether the contract between the parties was valid and legal because the
plaintiff failed to successfully challenge the validity of the arbitration
clause." 4 Although Prima Paint did not specifically address this
situation, the plain language of section 4 of the FAA 5 coupled with the
principle of severability of arbitration clauses, 216 provide strong support
for the conclusion that parties must specifically plead that the arbitration
agreement is invalid. Where a party to a commercial or maritime
transaction alleges that a contract containing an arbitration clause is void,
the court should not consider the validity of the arbitration agreement
unless a party specifically asserts that the arbitration clause is invalid as a
separately standing agreement." 7 The Burden and Lawrence courts
properly focused on the fact that the plaintiffs refusing to arbitrate had
failed to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement.2 8 As the
court pointed out, and as sections 2 and 4 of the FAA require, such a
challenge is essential to overcome the FAA's presumption that
arbitration agreements are enforceable in commercial contracts. 1 9
The Sixth Circuit's approach in Burden and the Fifth Circuit's
approach in Lawrence is sound because alleging that the underlying
commercial contract is void does not necessarily assume that the
212. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
213. See supraPart III.B.2.
214. See supra Part III.B.I.
215. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) provides, in pertinent part, that "[ilf the making of the arbitration
agreement... be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof."
216. See supra Part I.C.
217. See PrimaPaint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
218. Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 491-92 (2001).
219. The existence of such a presumption follows from the structure of section 2 of the FAA
providing that "[an arbitration provision].. . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon ... [any legal or equitable] grounds ... for the revocation of any contract." See 9 U.S.C. § 2.

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
arbitration agreement is likewise void for at least two reasons. First, the
FAA, Prima Paint, and other cases decided after the adoption of the
FAA treat arbitration clauses as separate contracts.22 ° Second, parties to a
commercial transaction containing an arbitration clause likely understand
that they will forego a judicial forum if any dispute arises out of the
contract.
In contrast, the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' conclusion that a
court should consider a party's claim that a contract containing an
arbitration clause is void 2 is questionable because it automatically
assumes that arbitration clauses are merely a part of the main commercial
contract. The Circuits adhering to this approach have never explicitly
considered the severability of arbitration clauses. By holding that
alleging that a contract is void is sufficient to put an arbitration provision
at issue within the meaning of section 4 of the FAA, the courts have
erroneously implicitly assumed that arbitration clauses are not severable
from the underlying contracts.222 This assumption that an arbitration
clause is merely a part of the underlying contract is flawed for two
reasons. First, courts adhering to this approach assume a fact that is
worth an independent determination-whether an arbitration provision
stands separately from the contract. Second, the assumption that an
arbitration provision is merely a part of the underlying contract flies in
the face of the FAA's treatment of arbitration provisions as separate
224
agreements, 23 which the Court in Prima Paint implicitly recognized.
Thus, the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits should reconsider their
approach to claims that a commercial contract containing an arbitration
clause is void, and allow courts to proceed to resolve such claims only
upon an express finding that the arbitration clause is not severable from
the allegedly void contract.

220. See id.; see also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409-10 (2d

Cir. 1959) (summarizing the cases that treat arbitration clauses as separate agreements unaffected by
invalidity of the underlying commercial contracts).

221. See supra Part III.A; Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136,
1140 (9th Cir. 1991).
222. See supra Part I.C.
223. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
224. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
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The Void/Voidable Distinction is Only Appropriate ifan Arbitration
Provision is Not Severable from the Underlying Commercial
Contract

It is true that the void/voidable distinction can be useful in
determining whether a party has in fact assented to an arbitration
agreement. Federal courts, when faced with an allegation that a contract
containing an arbitration clause is void from its very inception, should
first ascertain whether the arbitration clause is separable from the
contract. Given that the FAA treats arbitration provisions as severable
from the underlying contracts,225 courts should presume that an
arbitration provision is severable unless a party proves the opposite.
If a court finds that the arbitration clause is merely a part of the
underlying contract, the court should resolve the claim whether the
contract is void. This would be consistent with the position of the Third,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that "a party who contests the making of a
contract containing an arbitration provision cannot be compelled to
arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an agreement to
' However, if the court determines that the arbitration clause
arbitrate."226
is severable from the allegedly void contract, the court should consider
the enforceability of the arbitration clause only if a party puts the clause
itself in issue.227 This approach would help promote a uniform
application of Prima Paint's rule and avoid confusion related to the
specificity of factual situations in which the challenges to the contract
containing arbitration clauses arise. Further, it would be consistent with
the plain meaning of the FAA and a federal policy favoring enforcement
of arbitration agreements.2 2
V.

CONCLUSION

In a dispute over the validity or performance of a contract containing
an arbitration clause, a federal court, upon being satisfied that the subject
matter of the dispute falls within the scope of arbitrable issues, should
order the parties to proceed to arbitration unless any party to the contract
specifically asserts that the arbitration provision is not enforceable. The
225.
226.
1991).
227.
228.

Id.
Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir.
See PrimaPaint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
See supra Part I.A.

Challenging Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
U.S. Supreme Court in Prima Paint expressed no opinion as to which
forum, a court or an arbitrator, should adjudicate a party's allegation that
an entire contract containing an arbitration clause is void. However, the
Court made it clear that, under section 4 of the FAA, a specific challenge
to an arbitration agreement is necessary in order to avoid its enforcement.
A federal court considering whether a contract containing an
arbitration clause is void from its very inception should first ascertain
whether the arbitration clause is separable from the contract. In view of
the FAA's language and policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements, the court should presume severability of an arbitration
provision unless there is proof to the contrary. Only if the court finds that
an arbitration clause is merely a part of the underlying commercial
contract should the court resolve a claim that the contract is void. This
approach would promote uniform application of the Prima Paint rule to
different factual settings. Further, it is consistent with the plain
requirements of sections 2, 3 and 4 of the FAA and the strong federal
policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements in interstate and
international commerce.
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